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KAISER v. UNITED STATES
grounds of prior determination and waiver; nevertheless
the persistent petitioner files a request with the Court of
Appeals for leave to prosecute an appeal. The Court of
Appeals still must act on this request.4" Fortunately how-
ever, the provisions of the Act require a record which will
enable the Court of Appeals to quickly dispose of such
frivolous appeals.49 It is clear that in view of the provi-
sions of the Act and its obvious intent, a person seeking
relief under the Act would be well advised to carefully,
with the aid of counsel, marshal any and all grounds for
relief in his original petition.
The Legislature of this State by allowing appeals in
post conviction cases, has chosen to provide persons greater
safeguards of their liberty than are constitutionally re-
quired. To borrow from former Chief Judge Markell's
reference to the Act of 1945 which first granted appeals
in habeas corpus cases, the result of the Post Conviction
Procedure Act will be ". . . to put an end to long-standing
abuse of the writ and to preserve the writ for its historic
objects as a bulwark of liberty.""0
JOHN D. ALEXANDER, JR.
STRIKE BENEFITS - INCOME OR GIFTS?
Kaiser v. United States1
Plaintiff, an employee of the Kohler Company in Wis-
consin, on April 5, 1954, with other employees, went on
strike. At that time he was not a member of the Interna-
tional Union or the local affiliate at Kohler. During the
strike he did not receive benefits in cash, but in May, 1954,
he began to receive from the Union maintenance assistance
in the form of food, clothing and payments for rent on his
house. The Union determined the needs of the employees
by a questionnaire. On April 15, 1955, plaintiff filed his
income tax return and claimed a refund since the amount
,1 See discussion, 8upra, n. 18, and related text.
"See Maryland Rule 826 b, requiring the record to consist of the
original papers. Thus a glance at the subsequent petition will show the
true situation.
Markell, Review of Criminal Cases in Maryland by Habeas Corpus and
by Appeal, 101 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1154, 1162-1163 (1953).
1262 F. 2d 367 (7th Cir. 1958), cert. gr., # 858, 6/2/59. The Internal
Revenue Service announced that pending review of the Kaiser case, it will
continue to follow its position that strike benefits are taxable. Technical




withheld exceeded the tax liability for wages he had re-
ceived. On February 17, 1956, the Director increased the
adjusted gross income by adding $565.54, the value of the
maintenance assistance received by plaintiff. The plaintiff
paid the additional tax plus interest and sued for a refund
in the United States District Court.2 Counsel for both
parties informed the Court at the time of the pre-trial con-
ference that this was a case of first impression. At the close
of the plaintiff's case and at the close of all the evidence,
motions for a directed verdict by the defendant were de-
nied without prejudice, the Court feeling that if this were
to be a test case, it would be reviewed by appellate courts
and therefore there should be a complete record so that
no new trial would be necessary if the appellate court re-
versed. The case was tried before a jury with only one
question submitted to it for a special verdict, namely:
"'Were the amounts received by plaintiff, Allen Kaiser,
from May 14th to December 31st, 1954, from United
Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement
Workers of America, a gift?' 1)
The jury answered "yes" to this question and judgment
for plaintiff was entered on the verdict. The government
moved to set aside the verdict of the jury and the judgment
entered thereon and to enter judgment in accordance with
the government's previous motion for directed verdict, or,
in the alternative, for a new trial. The District Court held
that as a matter of law the payments to plaintiff constituted
taxable income to him, that no jury issue was presented
and that the government was entitled to have its motion
for directed verdict granted. The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, reversing the District Court, held the
strike benefits received by the plaintiff under the facts of
this case were not taxable income, but were gifts, expressly
excepted from taxable income by Section 102 of the In-
ternal Revenue Code of 1954, the evidence being found to
be sufficient to sustain the finding of the jury.
A dissent disagreed with the majority for two reasons:
(1) the determination of the character of the strike benefits
presented a question of law, for all the facts including the
Union's motivation and intent, were fully disclosed by
the stipulation of facts and the uncontroverted testimony;
1158 F. Supp. 865 (E.D. Wis. 1958).
8 Ibid., 866.
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and (2) the Union required consideration for the strike
benefits, in that participation in the strike was the primary
condition rather than the need of the striker.
The majority cited United States v. Burdick4 as authority
for holding that the question of whether the benefits were
in the nature of taxable income or gifts was one of fact.
In that case,5 the court said specifically:
".... whether the receipts are gifts is primarily a ques-
tion of fact to be resolved upon the peculiar circum-
stances of the case; ... if the payments were made with-
out a donative intent and as compensation for services
they constitute taxable income. The term 'gift' as used
in the revenue statute 'denotes * * * the receipt of
financial advantages gratuitously.' "'
The dissent was of the opinion that no factual issue
remained to be presented to the jury. The facts were stipu-
lated by both parties concerning the motivation and intent
of the Union when providing such benefits both to members
and non-members. The District Court had taken the same
position as the dissent, saying:
"The evidence in this case is not disputed. The ques-
tion basically is one of interpretation of the statutes.
Findings are held to be subject to review on this
question."'7
Whether a benefit received by a taxpayer is to be viewed
as taxable income or as a gift is basically a question of
statutory construction and Congressional intent. Section
61 (a) ,' defining gross income, has been construed as a broad
statement of purpose to tax income comprehensively.9 In
Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Company," Chief Justice
Warren said:
"This Court has frequently stated that this language
was used by Congress to exert in this field 'the full
'214 F. 2d 768 (3rd Cir. 1954).
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid., 771, quoting from Helvering v. Amer. Dental Co., 318 U.S. 322,
330 (1943).
7 158 F. Supp. 865, 869 (E.D. Wis. 1958).
8 1954 I.R.C. §61(a) General Definition. - "Except as otherwise provided
in this subtitle, gross income means all income from whatever source derived,
Including (but not limited to) the following Items: ......
9 Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, 49 (1949).
10348 U.S. 426 (1955).
1959]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
measure of its taxing power.' * * * And the Court has
given a liberal construction to this broad phraseology
in recognition of the intention of Congress to tax all
gains except those specifically exempted.""
Section 102 (a) ,12 pertaining to gifts, on the other hand,
has been construed strictly and with restraint, 3 since it is
in the nature of an exemption.
The Circuit Court reasoned that the Commissioner has
recognized that some receipts may be gifts without being
expressly excluded from income by the statute. Public
assistance relief payments 4 and disaster benefits" were
examples cited to substantiate this view.
The District Court gave a comprehensive definition of
gift within the meaning of Section 102 (a) :6
"A gift, within the meaning of section 102 (a), is the
receipt of financial advantages gratuitously, is made
from a detached and disinterested generosity, without
the incentive of anticipated benefit of any kind beyond
satisfaction of doing a generous act, without consid-
eration, . . . without the compulsion of moral or legal
duty, and is basically something for nothing. The vol-
untary character of the payment is not determinative,
for a payment may constitute income to the recipient
though made to him without legal obligation." 17
Implicit in any definition of gift, as above, is the re-
quirement there be no consideration. Although the ma-jority in the Circuit Court said the primary qualification
for receiving strike benefits was the need of the employee,
both the District Court and the dissent felt participation in
nIbid., 429-430. See also H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 3
U.S. Cong. & Admr. News (1954) 4155 where, in discussing §61(a) of the
1954 Code, it states:
"This section corresponds to section 22(a) of 'the 1939 Code. While
the language in existing section 22(a) has been simplified, the all-
Inclusive nature of statutory gross income has not been affected there-
by. Section 61(a) is as broad in scope as section 22(a).
"Section 61(a) provides that gross income includes 'all Income from
whatever source derived.' This definition is based upon the 16th
Amendment and the word 'income' is used in its constitutional sense."
11954 I.R.C. §102(a).
18 Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, 49 (1949) ; Helvering v. Amer.
Dental Co., 318 U.S. 322 (1943).
"Rev. Ruling 57-102, 1957-1 Cum. Bull. 26.
Rev. Ruling 53-131, 1953-2 Cum. Bull. 112.
161954 I.R.C. §102(a).
17158 F. Supp. 865, 870 (E.D. Wis. 1958).
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the strike was the principal condition for receiving benefits
with need secondarily important. The stipulated facts ad-
mitted the employees had to participate in the strike to
receive benefits. 8 It appears therefore, that the Union re-
ceived consideration for its payments, thereby eliminating
the possibility of these being construed as gifts.
Strike benefits paid to a member or non-member of a
union if he participates in the strike may be easily distin-
guished from subsistence to disaster victims by the Red
Cross, held to be non-taxable,' 9 or disaster benefits pro-
vided by an employer for his employees, measured solely
by need and considered gratuitous. 0 Strike payments are
made "in furtherance of a strike, which is a means em-
ployed to secure legitimate economic benefits for mem-
bers of the union.' ' 21 Although plaintiff was not a union
member when he received these benefits, he joined the
union soon thereafter.
The District Court quoted from a 1920 Revenue Ruling"
which treated strike benefits as included in gross income
as well as a 1957 Revenue Ruling2 which treats non-
members similarly, and concluded:
"Considering the length of time the unvaried ruling
and practice has been in effect, the non-technical na-
ture of the question, and the importance of the issue
in both the tax and labor fields, it must be concluded
that Congress was aware of the administrative inter-
pretation when it repeatedly re-enacted the sections.
Under such circumstances, the administrative interpre-
tation is not only entitled to great weight, but must
be held to have received Congressional approval and
to have assumed the force and effect of law. '24
Is262 F. 2d 367 (7th Cir. 1958), dis. op. 370. At 371, the stipulation is
set forth:
"'The Intcrnational Union grants strike benefits to non-members of
the Union, who participate in a strike, if they do not have sufficient
income to purchase food or to meet an emergency situation. The Union
treats such non-members on the same basis as members of 'the Union,
but non-members as well as members must be strikers before they
may receive assistance from the Union.'
"Spec. Ruling of I.R.S.. 52-5 CCH 6196.
,ORev. Ruling 53-131, 1953-2 Cum. Bull. 112.
Rev. Ruling 57-1. 1957-1 Cum. Bull. 15.
mO.D. 552. Cum. Bull. No. 2, 73 (1920). Also see, to the same effect,
I.T. 1293, Cum. Bull. I-1, 63 (1922).
Rev. Ruling 57-1, 1957-1 Cum. Bull. 15. Also see Rev. Ruling 58-139,
1958-1, Cum. 'Bull. 14, which cites the 1957 Revenue Ruling and says: "The
same principles are applicable to 'lockout' benefits, which, like strike bene-
fits, are distributed In furtherance of union objectives."
"1 158 F. Supp. 865, 871 (E.D. Wis. 1958).
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The Circuit Court placed little weight on Rulings being
decisive and said:
"It has been said the rules have 'no more binding or
legal force than the opinion of any other lawyers.'
It will be noted, however, that only a few paragraphs
earlier the Court was relying on Revenue Rulings to sup-
port its argument that strike benefits were analogous to
public assistance and disaster benefits."6
The courts have voiced varying opinions on the weight
to be accorded to Rulings. It is important to recognize that
there are legislative as well as interpretative rulings. Legis-
lative rules, being the product of a power to create new law,
may be deemed to have the force and effect of valid statutes
if the agency had the authority, procedurally and constitu-
tionally, to promulgate them. Interpretative rules, on the
other hand, merely clarify the law they interpret and theo-
retically do not embody new law. 7 The Supreme Court
has said the latter are also entitled to considerable weight.
In Helvering v. Winmill," the Supreme Court said:
"Treasury regulations and interpretations long con-
tinued without substantial change, applying to un-
amended or substantially reenacted statutes, are
deemed to have received congressional approval and
have the effect of law."
In Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company,29 the
Court had to decide whether a gain from a purchase and
re-sale of a corporation's own stock constituted gross in-
come to the corporation. The Court had to consider Section
22(a) of the Revenue Act of 1928, substantially like Sec-
tion 61 (a)," which defined gross income broadly. Finding
that a Treasury Regulation had construed this transaction
and treated it as capital rather than income, the Court said
-262 F. 2d 367. 370 (7th Cir. 1958), quoting from United States v.
Bennett, 186 F. 2d 407, 410 (5th Cir. 1951).
Ibid., 368-369.
1 DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1st ed. 1958) §5.03.
Is305 U.S. 79. 83 (1938), quoted with approval in Boehm v. Commissioner,
326 U.S. 287, 292 (1945). In Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140
(1944), the Court said:
"This Court has long given considerable and in some cases decisive
weight to Treasury Decisions and to interpretative regulations of the
Treasury and of other bodies that were not of adversary origin."
-306 U.S. 110, 113-114 (1939).
8 1954 I.R.C. §61(a).
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In the case at hand, the majority said, in any event, the
1920 Ruling 2 did not cover benefits paid to non-members.
The 1957 Ruling8 which expressly includes strike benefits
paid to non-members as taxable income was not considered,
presumably, since it was promulgated after the case arose.
Whether much weight can be given to the re-enactment
argument of the District Court is questionable. It would
seem that before one could say with certainty that Congress
has adopted an interpretative rule by the Treasury as evi-
dence of its view by repeated re-enactment of the statute,
it must be found Congress was aware of the ruling. Too
often this re-enactment argument appears to be a "tool
of the trade" used by the courts to get a desired result.
However the District Court seemed to have made a valid
point when it recognized that a ruling concerning the tax-
ability of strike benefits certainly had a widespread effect,
and therefore Congress could be presumed to have been
aware of it.
Furthermore, the other reasons for calling these strike
benefits income are more than sufficient. The Union seems
to have received consideration for making the payments.
From the standpoint of public policy, treating these benefits
as gifts rather than taxable income would tend to encourage
strikes. Since union dues are deductible to the union mem-
ber,34 it would seem that strike benefits should be taxable.
Such arguments in favor of treating the strike benefits as
income would appear to be more accurate and desirable,
both technically and policy-wise.
LYNN F. MEYms
Incumbrances On Devised Land
The Doctrine Of Exoneration
Tobiason v. Machen'
In 1953 Oliver F. Machen executed his last will and
testament. After making a general direction for the pay-
ment of all his debts, he devised all his "right, title, and
O1Supra, n. 29.
'2O.D. 552, Cum. Bull. No. 2, 73 (1920).
Rev. Ruling 57-1, 1957-1 Cum. Bull. 15.
O.D. 450, 1920-1 Cum. Bull. 105.
1 217 Md. 207, 142 A. 2d 145 (1958).
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